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Extension du mode`le d’Intru de Dolev-Yao pour
l’Analyse d’un Nombre Non Borne´ de Sessions
Re´sume´ : Nous proposons un mode`le de protocole inte´grant deux moyens diffe´rents
d’analyser les protocoles cryptographiques: i) analyse par rapport a` un nombre non borne´
de sessions mais des tailles de messages bone´es, et ii) analyse par rapport a` un nombre de
sessions a` priori borne´ mais avec des tailles de messages illimite´es. Nous montrons que dans
ce mode`le, la recherche d’une attaque de secret est DEXPTIME-comple`te. Ce re´sultat est
obtenu par une extension du mode`le d’intrus de Dolev-Yoa permettant de simuler l’exe´cution
d’un nombre non borne´ de sessions.
Mots-cle´s : Ve´rification, Re´e´criture, Analyse de Se´curite´, Attaque, Protocole, Preuve
Automatique, Logique et Complexite´
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1 Introduction
Formal analysis has been very successful in finding flaws in published cryptographic protocols
[7]. Even fully automatic analysis of such protocols is possible, based on models for which
security is decidable or based on approximations (see, e.g., [13, 19, 18, 1, 16], and [17, 9] for
an overview of the different approaches, decidability, and complexity theoretic results).
The decidability of security, or more precisely secrecy, of protocols heavily depends on
whether in the analysis an unbounded number of sessions of a protocol is taken into account
or only an a priori bounded number. In the former case, secrecy is in general undecidable
[1, 13, 14], with only a few exceptions [13, 11, 2, 8]. One such exception, which is of
particular interest in this paper, is that secrecy is DEXPTIME-complete when the message
size is bounded and nonces, i.e., newly generated constants, are disallowed [13]. In what
follows, let us call this setting the bounded message model. In the latter case, in which the
number of sessions is bounded, secrecy is known to be NP-complete [19], even when there is
no bound on the size of messages, complex keys are allowed, i.e., keys that may be complex
messages, and messages can be paired to form larger messages. We will refer to this setting
as the unbounded message model.
In this paper, we integrate the two models — the bounded and the unbounded message
model, and thus, integrate two different approaches for protocol analysis: i) analysis w.r.t. an
unbounded number of sessions, which has the advantage that the exact sessions to be an-
alyzed do not need to be provided beforehand, but where a bound on the size of messages
is put, and ii) analysis which is rather detailed since the size of messages is not bounded,
but where only explicitly given sessions are analyzed. More precisely, we consider a protocol
model in which there are two kinds of principals, bounded message and unbounded message
principals, or bounded and unbounded principals for short, which only accept messages of
bounded size from the environment or messages of unbounded size, respectively. Conversely,
in a protocol run, bounded principals may be involved in an unbounded number of sessions
while unbounded principals run in at most one session. The communication between the
principals is controlled by the standard Dolev-Yao intruder, in particular, the size of the
messages the intruder may produce is not bounded. Just as in the bounded and unbounded
message model, the principals and the intruder are not allowed to generate nonces. Our
model, in what follows referred to as integrated model, comprises both the bounded and
the unbounded message model: If in the integrated model the set of bounded principals
is empty, then the model coincides with the unbounded message model, and if the set of
unbounded principals is empty, then this gives the bounded message model.
The main result shown in this paper is that secrecy in the integrated model is DEXPTIME-
complete. The main difficulty is to establish the complexity upper bound. The key idea
is as follows: To deal with the bounded principals in the integrated model, and thus, the
unbounded number of sessions, the bounded principals are turned into intruder rules, and
thus, they extend the ability of the intruder to derive new messages. These intruder rules
can be applied by the intruder an arbitrary number of times and in this way simulate the un-
bounded number of sessions. More precisely, we will extend the standard Dolev-Yao intruder
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by oracle rules, i.e., intruder rules that satisfy certain properties, and show that insecurity
w.r.t. a set of unbounded principals and the extended intruder is in NP (given an oracle
for applying the oracle rules). — This result is obtained in a similar way as the one in [5],
although the kind of oracle rules considered in [5] is quite different from the rules studied
here. — We then turn the bounded principals into oracle rules, show that these rules in
fact simulate the bounded principals, and prove that the rules can be applied in exponential
time. These steps are non-trivial. From this, we conclude the desired complexity upper
bound, i.e., obtain a deterministic exponential time algorithm for deciding secrecy in the
integrated model.
As we will see in Section 3, the integrated model is not more powerful than the unbounded
message model in the sense that from every protocol in the integrated model one can con-
struct a protocol in the unbounded message model such that one protocol preserves secrecy
only if the other one does. Moreover, feeding this constructed protocol into an algorithm for
analyzing protocols in the unbounded message model, yields an alternative way of deciding
secrecy in the integrated model. However, since the number of (unbounded) principals in
the constructed protocol grows exponentially, using the NP-completeness result shown in
[19], this reduction only provides an NEXPTIME decision algorithm. (Note that, together
with the main result of this paper and the result shown in [19], the existence of a polynomial
time reduction from the integrated model to the unbounded message model would imply
NP=EXPTIME.) More importantly, the constructed protocol is too big for current analysis
tools in the unbounded messages model, e.g., [3, 18], since they can only handle a small
number of principals. Conversely, in our decision algorithm, we not only reduce secrecy in
the integrated model to secrecy in the unbounded message model but in addition extend
the Dolev-Yao intruder to simulate the bounded principals. In this way, we avoid creating
new (unbounded) principals. In addition to the improved complexity theoretic result, this
approach seems to be much better amenable to practical implementations. In fact, in [6] an
implementation is presented for an intruder with capabilities similar to those needed here.
Structure of the paper. In the following section, the protocol and intruder model is
presented. Then we state the main result (Section 3). In Section 4, the intruder extended
by oracle rules is introduced and it is shown that insecurity is in NP given an oracle for
applying oracle rules. We then, Section 5, turn bounded principals into oracle rules, and by
applying the result from Section 4 establish the complexity upper bound. We conclude in
Section 6.
We refer the reader to our technical report [4] for full proofs and a formal description of
the Three-Pass Mutual Authentication ISO Protocol in our model.
2 Problem Definition
We now provide a formal definition of our protocol and intruder model. We first define
terms and messages, then protocols, and finally the intruder and attacks.
INRIA
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2.1 Terms and Messages
Terms are defined according to the following grammar:
term ::= A |V | 〈term, term〉 | {term}sterm | {term}
p
K
where A is a finite set of constants (atomic messages), containing principal names, nonces,
keys, and the atomic messages secret and I (the intruder’s name); K is a subset of A denoting
the set of public and private keys; and V is a finite set of variables. We assume that there
is a bijection ·−1 on K which maps every public (private) key k to its corresponding private
(public) key k−1. The binary symbol 〈·, ·〉 is called pairing, the binary symbol {·}s· is
called symmetric encryption, the binary symbol {·}p· is public key encryption. Note that a
symmetric key can be any term and that for public key encryption only atomic keys (namely,
public and private keys from K) can be used.
Variables are denoted by x, y, terms are denoted by s, t, u, v, and finite sets of terms
are written E, F, ..., and decorations thereof, respectively. We abbreviate E ∪ F by E, F ,
the union E ∪ {t} by E, t, and E \ {t} by E \ t. The cardinality of a set S is denoted by
card(S).
For a term t and a set of terms E, V ar(t) and V ar(E) denote the set of variables
occurring in t and E, respectively.
A ground term (also called message) is a term without variables. A (ground) substitution
is a mapping from V to the set of (ground) terms. The application of a substitution σ to a
term t (a set of terms E) is written tσ (Eσ), and is defined as usual.
The set of subterms of a term t, denoted by Sub(t), is defined as follows:
  If t ∈ A ∪ V , then Sub(t) = {t}.
  If t = 〈u, v〉, {u}sv, or {u}
p
v, then Sub(t) = {t} ∪ Sub(u) ∪ Sub(v).
Let Sub(E) =
⋃
t∈E Sub(t). We define the size of a term and a set of terms basically as the
size of the representation as a dag. That is, the size |t| (|E|) of a term t (a set of terms E)
is card(Sub(t)) (card(Sub(E))).
2.2 Protocols
We now define principals and protocols.
Definition 1 A principal Π is a finite linear ordering of rules of the form R→ S where R
and S are terms. We assume that every variable in S occurs in R or on the left-hand side
of a rule preceding R→ S. The rules are called principal rules.
A protocol P is a tuple (Fu,Fb, EI ,D) where Fu and Fb are finite unions of principals,
and thus, partially ordered sets, EI is a finite set of messages with I ∈ EI , and D is some
representation of a finite set of messages such that the dag size of messages in the set
represented by D is lineary bounded in the size of the representation of D.
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Given a protocol P , in the following we will assume that A is the set of constants occurring
in P . We define the size |P | of P as the number of different subterms in Fu, Fb, and EI
plus the size of the representation of D. For instance, D may be a non-negative integer n
(encoded in unary) representing the set of all messages of dag size ≤ n. This implies that
the dag size of the set of messages represented by D is exponentially bounded in the size |P |
of the protocol. We define V ar(P ) to be the set of variables occurring in P .
The idea behind the definition of a protocol is as follows. In an attack on P the intruder
may use every principal in Fu at most once but the principals in Fb maybe used as often as
the intruder wishes. In other words, the principals in Fb may be involved in an unbounded
number of sessions in one attack while the principals in Fu only participate in at most one
session. It is well-known that deciding the security of a protocol w.r.t. an intruder who
may use an unbounded number of sessions and may produce messages of unbounded size is
undecidable [13, 2]. For this reason, we will restrict the messages that can be substituted
for variables of rules in Fb to belong to the finite domain D. However, we put no restrictions
on the variables of rules in Fu, i.e., these variables can be substituted by messages of
unbounded size. We therefore refer to principals in Fu as unbounded and to those in Fb as
bounded. A rule of an unbounded principal is called unbounded and analogously a rule of a
bounded principal is bounded. In the following section, attacks are defined formally and the
relationship to other models is further discussed. As mentioned, our technical report [4]
contains a formal description of a protocol in our protocol model.
2.3 The Intruder and Attacks
Our intruder model follows the Dolev-Yao intruder [12]. That is, the intruder has complete
control over the network and he can derive new messages from his initial knowledge and the
messages received from honest principals during protocol runs. To derive a new message, the
intruder can compose and decompose, encrypt and decrypt messages, in case he knows the
key. What distinguishes our model from most other models in which security is decidable
is that the intruder may use the (bounded) principals as often as he wishes to perform his
attack. As mentioned in the introduction, to deal with this, in Section 4 we will extend the
intruder by so-called oracle rules.
The intruder derives new messages from a given (finite) set of messages by applying
rewrite rules. A rewrite rule (or t-rule) L is of the form M → t where M is a finite set of
messages and t is a message. Given a finite set E of messages, the rule L can be applied to
E if M ⊆ E. We define the step relation →L induced by L as a binary relation on finite
sets of messages. For every finite set of messages E: E →L E, t (recall that E, t stands for
E ∪ {t}) if L is a t-rule and L can be applied to E. If L denotes a (finite or infinite) set of
intruder rules, then →L denotes the union
⋃
L∈L →L of the step relations →L with L ∈ L.
With →∗L we denote the reflexive and transitive closure of →L.
The set of rewrite rules the intruder can use is listed in Table 1. These rules are called
(Dolev-Yao) intruder rules. In the table, a, b denote (arbitrary) messages, K is an element
of K, and E is a finite set of messages.
INRIA
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Decomposition rules Composition rules
Pair Lp1(〈a, b〉): 〈a, b〉 → a Lc(〈a, b〉): a, b→ 〈a, b〉
Lp2(〈a, b〉): 〈a, b〉 → b
Asymmetric Lad({a}
p
K): {a}
p
K , K
−1 → a Lc({a}
p
K): a, K → {a}
p
K
Symmetric Lsd({a}sb): {a}
s
b, b→ a Lc({a}
s
b): a, b→ {a}
s
b
Table 1: Intruder Rules
The intruder rules are denoted as shown in Table 1. We consider Lp1(〈a, b〉), . . . , Lsd({a}sb)
and Lc(〈a, b〉), . . . , Lc({a}sb) as singletons. Note that the number of decomposition and com-
position rules is always infinite since there are infinitely many messages a, b.
We further group the intruder rules as follows. In the following, t ranges over all messages.
  Ld(t) := Lp1(t) ∪ Lp2(t) ∪ Lad(t) ∪ Lsd(t). In case, for instance, Lp1(t) is not defined,
i.e., the head symbol of t is not a pair, then Lp1(t) = ∅; analogously for the other rule
sets,
  Ld :=
⋃
t Ld(t), Lc :=
⋃
t Lc(t),
  LDY := Ld ∪ Lc (where DY stands for “Dolev and Yao”).
The set of messages the intruder can derive from a (finite) set E of messages is:
dDY (E) :=
⋃
{E′ | E →∗LDY E
′}.
Before we can define attacks on a protocol P = (Fu,Fb, EI ,D), we need some new notions.
Given a partially ordered set F of principal rules with associated ordering <, an execution
ordering pi for F is a bijective mapping from some subset F ′ of F into {1, . . . , card(F ′)}
such that L < L′ implies pi(L) < pi(L′) for every L, L′ ∈ F ′. The size of pi is card(F ′).
The partially ordered set of instantiations of the bounded principals in P is FDb := {Πσ
′ |
Π ∈ Fb and σ′ : V ar(Π)→ D}. The partially ordered set induced by P is FP := Fu ∪ FDb .
We are now prepared to define attacks. In an attack, a principal Π performs his sequence
(linear ordering) of principal rules R1 → S1, . . . , Rn → Sn one after the other. Note that
the different rules may share variables which are subsituted by the same message and in
this way model the (unbounded) memory of a principal. When in step i a message m is
received, then m is matched against Ri yielding a matcher σ (if any) with Riσ = m and
Π returns Siσ as output. Variables in Ri and Si which occurred in a previous step, and
thus, have been assigned a message already, are substituted by this message. As mentioned
in Section 2.2, the intruder may use an unbounded principal, i.e., a principal in Fu, at
most once, and he may use every bounded principal, i.e., a principal in Fb, as often has he
wishes (any time with a possibly different matching). The difference between unbounded
and bounded principals is as follows: While an unbounded principal accepts every message
as long as it matches the current input pattern Ri, a bounded principal expects that the
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variables are filled with elements of the domain represented by D. Thus, FDb is the set
of instances of bounded principals the intruder may use to perform an attack. Note that
subsequent use of an instance after the first time does not yield new knowledge. Therefore,
we assume w.l.o.g. that bounded principal instances in FDb are used only once. Note,
however, that FDb contains different (an exponential number of) instances of one bounded
principal. Altogether, the intruder may use every principal in FP once. For a subset of
these principals he (nondeterministically) chooses some execution ordering and then tries to
produce input messages for the principal rules. These input messages are derived from the
intruder’s initial knowledge and the output messages produced by executing the principal
rules. The aim of the intruder is to derive the message secret. Formally, attacks are defined
as follows.
Definition 2 Let P = (Fu,Fb, EI ,D) be a protocol and let FP be the partially ordered
set induced by P . An LDY -attack (or simply attack) on P is a tuple (pi, σ) where pi is an
execution ordering on FP , of size k, and σ is a ground substitution of the variables occurring
in P such that
Riσ ∈ dDY (S0, S1σ, ..., Si−1σ)
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k} where Ri → Si = pi−1(i), and
secret ∈ dDY (S0, S1σ, ..., Skσ).
The decision problem we are interested in is the following set of protocols where we assume
the terms occurring in a protocol to be given as dags.
Insecure := {P | there exists an LDY -attack on P}.
If we restrict the set Fb of bounded principals to be the empty set (and in this case we do not
need D), then this is the case of protocol analysis w.r.t. a bounded number of sessions and
unbounded message size as considered, for instance, in [15, 19, 18], and called unbounded
message model in the introduction. On the other hand, if we restrict Fu to be an empty set,
then this is basically the case of protocol analysis w.r.t. an unbounded number of sessions
but with bounded message size as studied in [13], and called bounded message model in the
introduction. We note, however, that in contrast to [13], here we allow the intruder to derive
messages of arbitrary size, only the size of messages accepted by the (bounded) principals
is bounded. Also, we allow complex rather than only atomic keys.
Summing up, with the protocol and the intruder model considered here, we integrate the
bounded and the unbounded message models.
3 Main Result
The main result of this paper is:
Theorem 1 The problem Insecure is DEXPTIME-complete.
INRIA
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In [13], it has been shown that deciding secrecy in the bounded model, i.e., an unbounded
number of sessions but bounded messages, is DEXPTIME-complete. Since here we extend
this setting, it is not surprising that for Insecure we also obtain DEXPTIME-hardness. In
fact, one can use the same reduction, namely a reduction from the recognition problem for
Datalog programs [10], as in [13].
In [19], it has been shown that deciding Insecure for protocols P without bounded
principals (i.e., Fb = ∅) is NP-complete. We can use this result to also obtain an upper bound
for Insecure in the general case: Let P = (Fu,Fb, EI ,D). Observe that P ∈ Insecure iff
P ′ = (Fu ∪ F
D
b , ∅, EI , ∅) ∈ Insecure. The protocol P
′ can be handled with the algorithm
proposed in [19]. However, since P ′ may be of size exponential in the size of P this only
shows that Insecure is in NEXPTIME. Thus, the main problem in proving Theorem 1 is
to establish the tight upper bound.
The main idea of this proof is as follows: We first extend capabilities of the Dolev-Yao
intruder by so-called oracle rules, i.e., intruder rules which satisfy certain conditions. For
this extended intruder we show that insecurity for protocols without bounded principals is
in NP given an oracle for performing oracle rules (Theorem 2). We then turn the set FDb
of instantiated bounded principals into intruder rules and show that these rules are in fact
oracle rules. This will yield the claimed exponential time upper bound (Section 5).
In the following section oracle rules are introduced and the NP-decision algorithm is
presented.
4 A General Framework
We now extend the Dolev-Yao intruder by oracle rules, which are intruder rules satisfying
certain conditions, and show that insecurity in presence of such an extended intruder for
protocols without bounded principals is in NP given a procedure for applying oracle rules.
We first introduce oracle rules and then present the NP algorithm.
4.1 Extending the Dolev-Yao Intruder by Oracle Rules
In the rest of this paper, let Lo denote a (finite or infinite) set of rewrite rules of the form
M → t where M is a finite set of messages and t is a message. In Definition 4, we will
impose restrictions on this set and then call it the set of oracle rules. The subset of Lo
consisting of t-rules is denoted by Lo(t). The union of the Dolev-Yao intruder rules and
the oracle rules is denoted by LDYO := LDY ∪ Lo and called oracle intruder rules. Define
Lc := Lc ∪Lo to be the set of composition rules, Lc(t) := Lc(t)∪Lo(t), and Ld(t) to be the
set of all decomposition t-rules in Table 1.
The set dDYO(E) of messages the intruder can derive from E using the rules LDYO
is defined analogously to dDY (E). Also, LDYO-attacks are defined analogously to LDY -
attacks.
Given finite sets of messages E, E ′, an (LDYO-)derivation D of length n, n ≥ 0 from E to
E′ is a sequence of steps of the form E →L1 E, t1 →L2 · · · →Ln E, t1, . . . , tn with messages
RR n
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t1, . . . , tn, E
′ = E ∪ {t1, . . . , tn}, and Li ∈ LDYO such that E, t1, . . . , ti−1 →Li E, t1, . . . , ti
and ti 6∈ E ∪ {t1, . . . , ti−1}, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The rule Li is called the ith rule in D
and the step E, t1, . . . , ti−1 →Li E, t1, . . . , ti is called the ith step in D. We write L ∈ D
to say that L ∈ {L1, . . . , Ln}. If L′ is a set of rewrite rules, then we write L′ /∈ D to say
L′ ∩ {L1, . . . , Ln} = ∅. The message tn is called the goal of D.
We also need well formed derivations which are derivations where every message gener-
ated by an oracle intruder rule is a subterm of the goal or a subterm of a term in the initial
set of messages.
Definition 3 Let D = E →L1 . . . →Ln E
′ be a derivation with goal t. Then, D is well
formed if for every L ∈ D and every t′: L ∈ Lc(t′) implies t′ ∈ Sub(E, t), and L ∈ Ld(t′)
implies t′ ∈ Sub(E).
We can now define oracle rules. Condition 1. in the following definition requires the existence
of well formed derivations. This will allow us to bound the length of derivations and the
size of messages needed in derivations. The remaining conditions are later used to bound
the size of the substitution σ of an attack.
Definition 4 Let Lo be a (finite or infinite) set of rules and P be a protocol. Then, Lo is
a set of oracle rules (w.r.t. Lc ∪ Ld as defined above) iff there exists a polynomial p(·) such
that:
1. For every message t, if t ∈ dDYO(E), then there exists a well formed derivation from
E with goal t.
2. If F →Lo(t) F, t and F, t →Ld(t) F, t, a, then there exists a derivation D from F with
goal a such that Ld(t) 6∈ D.
3. For every rule F → t ∈ Lo(t) we have |t| ≤ p(|P |) and for all t′ ∈ F , |t′| ≤ p(|P |).
In what follows, we always assume that Lo is a set of oracle rules. We call a protocol
P of the form (Fu, ∅, EI , ∅) restricted. We want to decide the insecurity of a restricted
protocol w.r.t. an intruder using LDYO, i.e., the Dolev-Yao intruder rules plus the oracle
rules. Formally, the decision problem we are interested in is the following set of restricted
protocols P :
InsecureO := {P | there exists an LDYO-attack on the restricted protocol P}
4.2 An NP Decision Algorithm
The following theorem is used to prove Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 Let Lo be a set of oracle rules. Given a procedure (an oracle) for deciding
E →Lo t for every finite set E of messages and message t in constant time, InsecureO can
be decided by a nondeterministic polynomial time algorithm.
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Input: restricted protocol P = (Fu, ∅, S0, ∅) with n = p(|P |), where p(·) is the polyno-
mial associated to the oracle rules, and V = V ar(P ).
1. Guess an execution ordering pi for P . Let k be the size of pi. Let Ri → Si = pi−1(i)
for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
2. Guess a normalized ground substitution σ such that |σ(x)| ≤ 3n2 for all x ∈ V .
3. Test that Riσ ∈ dDYO({S0σ, . . . , Si−1σ}) for every i < k.
4. Test that secret ∈ dDYO({S0σ, . . . , Skσ}).
5. If each test is successful, then answer “yes”, and otherwise, “no”.
Figure 1: NP Decision Procedure for Insecurity
The NP decision procedure is given in Figure 1. In (1) and (2) of the procedure, an attack
(pi, σ) is guessed of size polynomially bounded in n. Then, it is checked whether this is in
fact an attack.
Obviously, the procedure is sound. As for completeness, one needs to show that it
suffices to only consider substitutions bounded as done in the procedure. This is proved in
Section 4.3, Theorem 3.
To show that the procedure is in fact an NP procedure given a procedure for deciding
E → t ∈ Lo, we prove that (3) and (4) can be decided by an NP algorithm. Given that
|Riσ, S0σ, . . . , Si−1σ| is polynomially bounded in |P | for every i ≤ k (see Corollary 1), it
suffices to show that the following problem belongs to NP (given the decision procedure for
E → t ∈? Lo):
Derive := {(E, t) | there exists an LDYO-derivation from E with goal t }.
In this problem, E and t are assumed to be represented as dags. The following lemma
follows quite easily from the existence of well formed derivations (see [4] for the proof).
Lemma 1 Given a procedure for deciding E →? t ∈ Lo, Derive can be decided in nonde-
terministic polynomial time.
From Theorem 3 proved in the following section, completeness of the procedure depicted in
Figure 1 follows.
4.3 Polynomial Bounds on Attacks
To show completeness of the NP decision algorithm depicted in Figure 1, we need to prove
that it suffices to consider substitutions bounded as in the second step of this algorithm. To
this end, we consider an attack of minimal size, a so-called normal attack, and show that
the size of this attack can be bounded as stated in the algorithm.
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Given an attack (pi, σ) on a protocol P define |σ| := Σx∈V ar(P )|σ(x)|. We say that the
attack (pi, σ) is normal if |σ| is minimal, i.e., for every attack (pi′, σ′), |σ| ≤ |σ′|. Clearly, if
there is an attack, there is a normal attack. Note also that a normal attack is not necessarily
uniquely determined.
The next lemma says that normal attacks can always be constructed by linking subterms
that are initially occurring in the problem specification or by terms bounded by p(|P |). This
will allow us to bound the size of attacks as desired (Theorem 3 and Corollary 1). To state
the lemma, we need some notation.
Let P , Ri, Si, (pi, σ), V , p(·), and k be defined as in Figure 1. Let SP = Sub({Rj |j ∈
{1, . . . , k}} ∪ {Sj |j ∈ {0, . . . , k}}). We recall that A ⊆ SP .
Definition 5 Let t and t′ be two terms and θ a ground substitution. Then, t is a θ-match
of t′, denoted t vθ t
′, if t is not a variable, and tθ = t′.
In [4], we prove:
Lemma 2 Given a normal attack (pi, σ), for all variables x: |σ(x)| ≤ p(|P |) or there exists
t ∈ SP such that t vσ σ(x).
Using this lemma, it is now easy to bound the size of every σ(x) (see [4] for the proof):
Theorem 3 For every protocol P , if (pi, σ) is a normal attack on P , then |{σ(x) |x ∈ V ar}| ≤
3 · p(|P |)2, where |P | is the size of P as defined in Section 2.2 and p(·) is the polynomial
associated to the set of oracle rules.
From this, we easily obtain:
Corollary 1 For every protocol P and normal attack (pi, σ) on P : |Riσ, S0σ, . . . , Si−1σ|
and |Secret, S0σ, . . . , Skσ| can be bounded by a polynomial in |P | for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
5 Proof of the Complexity Upper Bound
We now show the complexity upper bound claimed in Theorem 1. In what follows, let
P = (Fu,Fb, EI ,D) be a protocol.
The idea of the proof is to turn the partially ordered set FDb of instantiated bounded
principals into oracle rules and then use Theorem 2.
The conversion of FDb is carried out in two steps. First, this set is turned into a set of
so-called aggregated rules. Then, the rules are turned into oracle rules.
5.1 Aggregated Rules
The set FDb consists of a finite set of (instantiated) principals Π. Assume that the linear
ordering associated to Π is <, Π = {R0 → S0, . . . , Rn−1 → Sn−1}, and Ri → Si < Rj → Sj
for every i < j.
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Now, replace every Ri → Si in Π by a rewrite rule {R0, . . . , Ri} → Si. We denote the
resulting set by Πagg and call this set the aggregated version of Π. Let Fagg denote the set
obtained from FDb by replacing every principal by its aggregated version. We call this set
the set of aggregated rules induced by P . Define Lagg := LDY ∪ Fagg , the set of aggregated
intruder rules (induced by P ). Note that Lagg depends on P . However, for simplicity, we
omit P in the notation of this set.
The set of terms the intruder can derive from E using Lagg is defined as:
dagg(E) :=
⋃
{E′ | E →∗Lagg E
′}.
An Lagg-attack on P is defined analogously to LDY -attacks.
The following lemma states that there is an LDY -attack on P iff there exists an Lagg-
attack on P when the bounded principals of P are removed. In other words, the bounded
principals are moved to the intruder. The proof of this lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 3 There exists an LDY -attack on P = (Fu,Fb, EI ,D) iff there exists an Lagg-
attack on (Fu, ∅, EI , ∅).
From this and if Fagg were oracle rules (in the sense of Definition 4), Insecure ∈ DEXPTIME
would immediately follow from Theorem 2. In general the set Fagg does not meet the restric-
tions on oracle rules. Therefore, we define principal oracle rules meeting the restrictions on
oracle rules. In what follows, they are formally defined and it is shown that whether E → t
is such a rule can be decided in exponential time. Then, we show that these rules can replace
aggregated rules and that they are oracle rules. Together with Theorem 2, this will yield
Theorem 1.
5.2 Principal Oracle Rules
Let Subr(Fagg) denote the set of subterms occurring on the right hand-side of rewrite rules
in Fagg.
Definition 6 A principal oracle rule induced by a protocol P is a rewrite rule of the form
E → t where E is some finite set of ground terms with |u| ≤ |P |2 for every u ∈ E and
t ∈ Subr(Fagg) such that t ∈ dagg(E). Let Fp denote the set of principal oracle rules
induced by P .
Note that in the above definition |t| ≤ |P |2 and Fagg ⊆ Fp.
We now show that principal oracle rules can be decided in exponential time.
Proposition 1 For every E and t, it can be decided in exponential time in the dag size of
E and P whether E → t ∈ Fp.
The key to the proof of this proposition is the following lemma, which is proved in [4].
Intuitively, it states that Lagg-derivations are well-formed in the sense that the messages
produced in each step of the derivation are subterms of a certain set of messages. Note that
Lagg-derivations are derivations, as defined in Section 4.1, which use only intruder rules from
Lagg . In what follows, let H denote the set of subterms of Fagg .
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Lemma 4 Assume that E → t ∈ Fp. Let D denote a derivation from E with goal t over
Lagg of minimal length. Then, u ∈ Sub(E, t,H) for every message u such that there exists
a u-rule in D.
Now to test whether E → t ∈ Fp one can iteratively apply rules in Lagg to E that create
subterms of E, t,H. Let E′ be the resulting set of terms. Then, Lemma 4 ensures that
t ∈ E′ iff E → t ∈ Fp. It is easy to see that E ′ can be computed in time exponential in the
size of P . This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
5.3 Principal Oracle Rules can Replace Aggregated Rules
Let Lp := LDY ∪ Fp be the set of principal intruder rules. The set of terms the intruder
can derive from E using Lp is defined as dp(E) :=
⋃
{E′ | E →∗
Lp
E′}. An Lp-attack on P
is defined analogously to LDY -attacks.
Obviously, dagg(E) = dp(E) for every finite set E of messages. As an immediate conse-
quence, we obtain:
Lemma 5 Let P = (Fu,Fb, EI ,D) be a protocol and let Lagg and Lp be the aggregated and
principal intruder rules induced by P . Then, there exists an Lagg-attack on (Fu, ∅, EI , ∅) iff
there exists an Lp-attack on this protocol.
Together with Lemma 3 this yields:
Proposition 2 Let P = (Fu,Fb, EI ,D) be a protocol and let Lp be the principal intruder
rules induced by P . Then, there exists an LDY -attack on P iff there exists an Lp-attack on
(Fu, ∅, EI , ∅).
5.4 Principal Oracle Rules are Oracle Rules
In what follows, we identify Lo with Fp, and show that Lo is a set of oracle rules. By
definition of Fp, the last condition on oracle rules (Definition 4, 3.) is met with p(n) = n2.
The following lemma shows the second condition in the definition of oracle rules.
Lemma 6 If F →Lo(t) F, t and F, t→Ld(t) F, t, a, then there exists a derivation D from F
with goal a such that Ld(t) 6∈ D.
Proof. The proof is obvious. It suffices to observe that a ∈ dp(F ) ∩ Subr(Fagg), and thus,
F → a ∈ Fp. 
The next lemma, shown in [4], states that if a derivation exists, then also a well formed
derivation.
Lemma 7 If t ∈ dp(E), then there exists a well formed derivation with goal t.
The two lemmas imply:
Proposition 3 The set Lo of principal oracle rules is a set of oracle rules.
Now, together with Theorem 2 and Proposition 1 this shows the complexity upper bound
claimed in Theorem 1.
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6 Conclusion
We have proposed a protocol model which integrates what we have called the unbounded
and the bounded message models, and we have shown that deciding secrecy in our model is
EXPTIME-complete. For this purpose we have extended the Dolev-Yao intruder in a general
framework by oracle rules and applied this framework to handle an unbounded number of
sessions.
In future work, we will investigate in how far this framework can be applied to yield
other interesting extensions of the Dolev-Yao intruder. Another question is whether the
oracle rules introduced here can be combined with those considered in [5], with the potential
of even more powerful intruders, e.g., those combining unbounded number of sessions with
the XOR operator.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is straightforward. If m ∈ dDYO(E), then Definition 4 implies that there exists a
well formed derivation D = E →L1 E, t1 → . . . →Lr E, t1, .., tr, with tr = t. In particular,
ti ∈ Sub(E, t) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. By definition of derivations, all ti are different. It
follows that r ≤ |t, E|.
Now, to decide m ∈ dDYO(E) an NP procedure can first guess a sequence w = w0 · · ·wr−1
with r ≤ |t, E| and wi ∈ {Ld(t
′), Lc(t
′), Lo(t
′) | t′ ∈ Sub(E, t)}, i < r. Note that the set is
considered a finite alphabet and that every element of this alphabet can be represented in
size linear bounded in |t, E|. Now, using the oracle for deciding Lo-steps, it can be decided
in polynomial time whether by applying the oracle intruder rules to E according to w the
message t is derived. Note that to apply an Lo-step creating t
′ one can first guess a subset
E′ of the current set of messages and than check whether E ′ → t′ ∈ Lo.
B Proof of Lemma 2
Before proving the lemma, we need to introduce some notation and state other lemmas.
If t ∈ dDY (E), we denote by Dt(E) a well formed derivation from E with goal t (chosen
arbitrarily among the possible ones). Note that there always exists such a derivation since
the definition of oracle rules ensures that a well formed derivation exists iff a derivation
exists.
The proof of the following lemma is obvious.
Lemma 8 For every finite set E of messages, message t, and t-rule L, if E →L E, t, then
all proper subterms of t are subterms of E or of size ≤ p(|P |).
Proof. For L ∈ Lo this is by definition of oracle rules (Definition 4) and for L ∈ Ld ∪ Lc
the statement is obvious. 
We also need:
Lemma 9 Let E be a finite set of messages and t, t′ be two messages such that |t′| > p(|P |),
t′ is a subterm of t but not a subterm of E, and t ∈ dDYO(E). Then, t
′ ∈ dDYO(E), and
furthermore, there exists a (well formed) derivation such that the last step of this derivation
is a composition rule.
Proof. Let D = E0 →L1 E1 · · · →Ln En be a derivation of t from E. Then, there exists a
least i 6= 0 such that t′ ∈ Sub(Ei) since t′ is a subterm of En. Assume that Li is an s-rule
for some s. Then, t′ is a subterm of s. If t′ is a proper subterm of s, Lemma 8 implies that
t′ is a subterm of Ei−1 in contradiction to the minimality of i. Thus, t
′ = s and therefore,
t′ ∈ dDYO(E). By the definition of oracle rules, there exists a well formed derivation D′ of
t′. If the last step in this derivation is a decomposition rule, then this implies t′ ∈ Sub(E)
in contradiction to the assumption. Thus, the last step of D′ is a composition rule. 
The following lemma is used in the proof of Lemma 11. It states that if a term γ can be
derived from a set of messages E such that the last rule is a composition rule, say composing
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two messages γ1 and γ2 both derived from E, then it is always possible to avoid decomposing
γ with Ld in a derivation from E with goal t for some t since such a decomposition would
generate a message γ1 or γ2 that can be derived from E in another way.
In the proof of the lemma we use the following notation. If D1 = E1 → . . . → F1 and
D2 = E2 → . . .→ F2 are two derivations such that E2 ⊆ F1, then D = D1.D2 is defined as
the concatenation of the steps of D1 and the ones in D2. In addition, to obtain a derivation,
we delete in D the steps from D2 that generate terms already present.
Lemma 10 Assume t ∈ dDYO(E) and γ ∈ dDYO(E) such that there exists a derivation Dγ
from E with goal γ ending with an application of a rule in Lc. Then, there is a derivation
D′ from E with goal t satisfying Ld(γ) 6∈ D′.
Proof. We may assume that Ld(γ) 6∈ Dγ since a rule in Ld(γ) can only be applied if γ
is already present and then the last rule in Dγ cannot be a composition rule generating γ.
Define D = Dγ .Dt(E). Note that D is a derivation with goal t. To construct from D the
derivation D′, we distinguish two cases:
  Assume that in Dγ , γ was composed with L ∈ Lc(γ). Then, Ld(γ) /∈ D since the (two)
direct subterms of γ are created in Dγ , and therefore, Ld(γ) will not occur in D. In
other words, D′ = D is the derivation we are looking for.
  Assume that in Dγ , γ was composed with L = Lo(γ). Then, if Ld(γ) /∈ D, with D′ = D
we are done. Otherwise, let F1 be the set of messages obtained by applying Dγ . Now,
Definition 4, (2) implies that every step in D of the form F1, F2, γ →Ld(γ) F1, F2, γ, β
can be replaced by a derivation from F1, F2 with goal β that does not contain rules
from Ld(γ). Replacing steps in this way and then removing redundant steps yields the
derivation D′ we are looking for.

The subsequent lemma will allow us to replace certain subterms occurring in a substitution
of an attack by smaller terms.
Lemma 11 Let E and F be sets of messages with I ∈ E. Let t ∈ dDYO(E, F ) and s ∈
dDYO(E), s /∈ Sub(E), and |s| > p(|P |). Finally, let δ be the replacement [s ← I ]. Then,
tδ ∈ dDYO(Eδ, Fδ).
Proof. By Lemma 9, there exists a well formed derivation Ds from E with goal s such that
the last step is a composition rule. By Lemma 10, there exists a derivation Dt from E, F with
goal t such that Ld(γ) /∈ Dt. Assume that Dt = E, F →L1 E, F, t1 →L2 E, F, t2 · · · →Ln
E, F, t1 . . . , tn. We show tiδ ∈ dDYO(Eδ, Fδ) by induction on i ≤ n where t0 is some term
in E, F . Induction base: If t0 ∈ E ∪ F , then clearly t0δ ∈ Eδ ∪ Fδ. Induction step: We
distinguish several cases.
  If Li = Lc(〈a, b〉), then either ti = s, and thus, tiδ = I ∈ dDYO(Eδ, Fδ), or tiδ =
〈aδ, bδ〉 ∈ dDYO(Eδ, Fδ) since by induction we have {aδ, bδ} ⊆ dDYO(Eδ, Fδ, t1δ, .., ti−1δ).
Analogously for {a}sb and {a}
p
K .
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  If Li = Lp1(〈ti, a〉), then s 6= 〈ti, a〉 since Li /∈ Ld(s). Therefore, 〈ti, a〉 δ = 〈tiδ, aδ〉.
By induction, 〈ti, a〉 δ ∈ dDYO(Eδ, Fδ), and thus, tiδ ∈ dDYO(Eδ, Fδ). Analogously
for Lp2, Lsd, and Lad.
  If Li ∈ Lo, then thanks to Definition 4, (3), we have |ti| ≤ p(|P |) and Li = F ′ → ti
with |u| ≤ p(|P |) for every u ∈ F ′. But then tiδ = ti, F
′δ = F ′, and by induction,
F ′δ ∈ dDYO(Eδ, Fδ). Thus, tiδ ∈ dDYO(Eδ, Fδ).
For i = n, this gives us tδ ∈ dDYO(Eδ, Fδ). 
We can now show Lemma 2.
Assume that (*): |σ(x)| > p(|P |) and for every t, t vσ σ(x) implies t 6∈ SP . We will
lead this to a contradiction. Since A ⊆ SP , we have σ(x) 6∈ Atoms. There exists j such
that σ(x) ∈ Sub(Rjσ) since there exists Rj with x ∈ V ar(Rj). Let Nx be minimal among
the possible j. Define E0 := S0σ ∪ . . . ∪ SNx−1σ. Assume σ(x) ∈ Sub(Sjσ) with j < Nx.
Note that σ(x) 6∈ Sub(S0) since otherwise σ(x) ∈ SP , and thus, j > 0. Because of (∗) there
must exist y ∈ V ar(Sj) with σ(x) ∈ Sub(σ(y)). By definition of principals, there exists an
Rj′ with j
′ ≤ j and y ∈ V ar(Rj′ ). But then, σ(x) ∈ Sub(Rj′σ) in contradiction to the
minimality of Nx. Thus, σ(x) /∈ Sub(E0). Using that RNxσ ∈ dDYO(E0), Lemma 9 implies
σ(x) ∈ dDYO(E0), and there exists a derivation of σ(x) from E0 such that the last step is a
composition rule.
Let us define the replacement δ = [σ(x) ← I ]. Since (pi, σ) is an attack, for all j, we
have:
Rjσ ∈ dDYO(S0σ, . . . , Sj−1σ).
We distinguish two cases:
  Assume j < Nx. Then, by minimality of Nx, σ(x) is neither a subterm of Rjσ nor
a subterm of S0σ, . . . , Sj−1σ. Hence, Rjσ ∈ dDYO(S0σ, . . . , Sj−1σ) implies (Rjσ)δ ∈
dDYO((S0σ)δ, . . . , (Sj−1σ)δ).
  Assume j ≥ Nx. Now, with E = E0 and F = SNxσ, . . . , Sj−1σ, Lemma 11 implies
(Rjσ)δ ∈ dDYO((S0σ)δ, . . . (Sj−1σ)δ).
Thus, (Rjσ)δ ∈ dDYO((S0σ)δ, . . . (Sj−1σ)δ) in both cases. Now, since for all t with t vσ σ(x)
it follows t 6∈ SP , we can conclude:
Rjσ
′ ∈ dDYO(S0σ
′, . . . , Sj−1σ
′)
where σ′ = σδ. Hence, (pi, σ′) is an attack. But since σ′ is obtained from σ by replacing
σ(x) by a strictly smaller message, namely I , we obtain |σ′| < |σ|, a contradiction to the
assumption that (pi, σ) is a normal attack.
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C Proof of Theorem 3
Let S = {σ(x) |x ∈ V ar} and S ′ = {σ(x) |x ∈ V ar and |σ(x)| ≤ p(|P |)}. We will bound
|S|. Given a set of messages Z, let
VZ = {x ∈ V ar |σ(x) /∈ Z and |σ(x)| > p(|P |)},
PZ = {t ∈ SP | tσ /∈ Z}.
We note that Z ⊆ Z ′ implies VZ′ ⊆ VZ and PZ′ ⊆ PZ , and that VS = ∅.
Claim. |S ∪ PS | ≤ |S′ ∪ VS′ ∪ PS′ |.
Proof of the claim. We construct a sequence of sets S = Z1 ⊃ Z2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Zn with
Zi+1 = Zi \ vi where vi ∈ Zi is a maximal message in Zi (w.r.t. the subterm ordering) of
size |vi| > p(|P |). For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we prove
|Zi ∪ VZi ∪ PZi | ≤ |Zi+1 ∪ VZi+1 ∪ PZi+1 |
which concludes the proof of the claim. At step i, one of two cases may arise when removing
v = vi ∈ Zi from Zi:
Since |v| > p(|P |), by Lemma 2 there exists t∈SP such that t vσ v. Then,
|Zi ∪ VZi ∪ PZi | ≤
∣∣Zi+1 ∪ VZi+1 ∪ {t} ∪ PZi
∣∣
≤
∣∣Zi+1 ∪ VZi+1 ∪ PZi+1
∣∣
since σ(y)∈ Zi\v = Zi+1 for every y ∈ V ar(t) and PZi ∪{t} ⊆ PZi+1 . This proves the claim.
Using the claim and
|PS′ | ≤ |SP | ≤ |P |
we obtain
|{σ(x) |x ∈ V ar}| ≤ |S| ≤ |S ∪ PS | ≤ |VS′ ∪ PS′ |+ |S′|
≤ |V ar| + |P |+ |V ar| · p(|P |) ≤ 3 · p(|P |)2
D Proof of Lemma 4
By contradiction, suppose there exists a u-rule L in D such that u /∈ Sub(E, t,H). By
definition, L /∈ Fagg .
Suppose L ∈ Lc and w.o.l.g. assume that (*): for all v and v-rules L
′ ∈ Lc ∩D following
L in D, v ∈ Sub(E, t,H). (Otherwise consider such an L′ instead of L.) We know that
u 6= t. Thus, by minimality of D, there must be one rule L′ applied after L in D using
u, i.e., u occurs on the left-hand side of L′. We have L′ /∈ Ld since otherwise L′ could be
removed. Also, L′ /∈ Fagg since all terms occurring in Fagg belong to H. If L′ ∈ Lc, then
the term, say v, produced by L′ contains u as subterm. But then, v /∈ Sub(E, t,H) and we
have a contradiction to (*).
Thus, L ∈ Ld(v) ∩ D for some v. Assume w.o.l.g. that (**): for all v′ and v′-rules
L′ ∈ Ld ∩ D preceding L in D, v
′ ∈ Sub(E, t,H). By definition of decomposition rules it
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follows v /∈ H. Thus, v was not created by a rule in Fagg . By the proof for Lc it was also
not created by a rule in Lc, and because of (∗∗) it was also not created by a rule in Ld.
Thus, v ∈ Sub(E), and therefore, u ∈ Sub(E), which is a contradiction.
E Proof of Lemma 7
Let D be a derivation of minimal length from E with goal t. Because of Lemma 6 we may
assume (*): Ld(s) 6∈ D in case s was created by Lo(s).
First, assume that L ∈ D ∩ Ld(s) ∩ Ld(s′) for some s and s′. We need to prove that
s ∈ Sub(E). We prove that s′ ∈ Sub(E), which implies s ∈ Sub(E) by the definition of
decomposition rules. If s′ ∈ E, nothing is to show. Otherwise, s′ was created before L
was applied. This term cannot be created by some rule in Lc(s
′) since then L would be
redundant in contradiction to the minimality of D. Furthermore, by assumption (*), s′ was
not created by Lo(s
′). Thus, s′ was created by a rule in Ld(s
′). Now, we can proceed with
s′ instead of s and iterating this argument it follows s′ ∈ Sub(E).
Now, assume that L ∈ D ∩ Lc(s). We need to show s ∈ Sub(E, t). We first observe:
Remark. If F →Lc(v) F, v →Lo(u) F, v, u, then F →Lo(u) F, u.
Now, if s = t, we have s ∈ Sub(E, t). Otherwise, because of the minimality of D, there
must exist a rule in D that uses s, i.e., s occurs on the left-hand side of this rule. If this
rule is in Ld, then from the definition of decomposition rules and the first part of the proof
of Lemma 7, it follows s ∈ Sub(E). If the rule is in Lc, then s is a subterm of the term, say
s′, created by Lc. By applying the argument to s
′ and iterating it, we obtain s ∈ Sub(E, t).
Otherwise, if s is only used in rules in Lo, then by the remark, we can remove L from D,
which is a contradiction to the minimality of D.
F Example
As an example of a protocol we consider the Three-Pass Mutual Authentication ISO Protocol
as given in [7].
1.B → A : Rb
2.A→ B : Ra, {Ra, Rb, B, Text2}sKab
3.B → A : {Rb, Ra, Text4}sKab
Figure 2: Three pass mutual authentication protocol
Informally, the protocol is described in the usual Alice and Bob notation in Figure 2. In
this protocol, Kab is a symmetric key. On receiving message 2., B checks that Rb and B are
present, and on receiving message 3., A checks that Ra and Rb are the same as in messages
2. and 1., respectively.
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Formally, the protocol is defined by a tuple (Fu,Fb, EI ,D) where A is instantiated by
Alice and B by Bob, both as an unbounded and as a bounded principal. The corresponding
rules are given in Figure 2. The initial intruder knowledge EI is set to {I}, and D to the
set of constants.
Principals in Fu:
Alice: (A.1) xRb ⇒ Ra(1), {Ra(1), xRb, Bob, T ext2}
s
Kab
(A.2) {xRb, Ra(1), T ext4}
s
Kab
⇒ End
Bob: (B.1) I ⇒ Rb(1)
(B.2) xRa, {xRa, Rb(1), Bob, T ext2}
s
Kab
⇒ {Rb(1), xRa, T ext4}
s
Kab
Principals in Fb:
Alice: (A′.1) xRb,b ⇒ Ra(2), {Ra(2), xRb,b, Bob, T ext2}
s
Kab
(A′.2) {xRb,b, Ra(2), T ext4}
s
Kab
⇒ End
Bob (B′.1) I ⇒ Rb(2)
(B′.2) xRa,b, {xRa,b, Rb(2), Bob, T ext2}
s
Kab
⇒ {Rb(2), xRa,b, T ext4}
s
Kab
Figure 3: Protocol rules for TPMA.
In these rules, variables subscripted by b can only be substituted by terms from D; Ra(1),
Ra(2), Rb(1), and Rb(2) denote different constants.
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